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uch of what was discussed in Michael Fleming’s paper
  and those that preceded it was, in my opinion, 
interesting, but methodologically flawed. Of course, the data in 
the papers are all correct, but I would like to present an 
alternative view that explains what happened to the fixed-
income markets in the fall of 1998 as well as shows that the 
concern over Treasuries’ benchmark status is sort of a black 
flag without much meaning.
To begin, there is not enough historical perspective in these 
papers. We have been here many times before. The major 
problem we encounter is that Treasuries are a poor hedging 
vehicle. One reason for this problem is that people always 
assume that the representative investor is long securities and 
wants to short on-the-run Treasuries as a hedge. In the first half 
of 1998, the spread between on-the-run and off-the-run 
Treasuries was almost zero. The question, then, is who would 
want to be long an off-the-run security and short an on-the-
run security at a yield spread approaching zero? This is a 
position in which a trader will make no money if things go well 
(if spreads remain narrow) and one in which a trader will get 
hurt badly if spreads widen. Moreover, history tells us that 
under such conditions there is a very big possibility that a large 
“event” will cause spreads to widen. This is exactly what 
happened in the second half of 1998. 
Part of the problem leading up to fall 1998 was the poor use 
of econometrics, particularly by certain hedge funds. Modern 
risk management systems rely heavily on calculating value at 
risk and other measures of potential losses using statistics based 
on data from the recent past. Of course, these statistics cannot 
evaluate gains and losses for events that did not happen. As a 
result, if we develop a value-at-risk statistic during relatively 
stable times with narrow spreads, many spread trades will look 
relatively safe, and market participants—in this case, certain 
hedge funds—will start investing in them on a heavily 
leveraged basis.
Furthermore, the increased speed of trading and data 
analysis in recent years has made this problem more complex. 
All traders use essentially the same methodology to evaluate 
risk. In addition, everyone analyzes the same data on a daily 
basis. Thus, everyone conducts the same basic trades and 
arbitrages. In such a marketplace, when a large (negative) 
shock to the system occurs, the risk management systems 
indicate that traders should liquidate their positions at 
approximately the same time. By doing so, of course, the 
traders push prices down even further, which causes them to 
liquidate even more positions, and so on.
This situation was complicated last year by the structure of 
the Treasury repo market. First, this market is, at least during 
normal times, almost 100 percent leveraged. This is a poorly 
understood fact of the market. Dealers themselves do not pay 
any margins, and market making is so competitive (in good 
times, at least) that anyone making large trades can shop 
around until a dealer is found who is willing to finance at nearly 
100 percent. During the 1998 crisis, some of the leverage 
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disappeared. Large traders, such as hedge funds and relative-
value firms, very quickly were asked to put up 2 percent 
margin, rather than almost zero. As a result, many relative-
value trades, which had looked attractive when financed at 
100 percent, became de minimis trades when financed at 
98 percent. This issue highlights the nature of arbitrage: 
trading huge amounts of securities for a miniscule spread on a 
highly leveraged basis. A small change in the cost of leverage 
will force traders out of arbitrage because of their risk 
management constraints.
By the way, one reason why margins rose and leverage fell 
was that the dealer community and the bank community had 
exactly the same kinds of trades as the hedge funds did. When 
dealers and banks began to post their own spread losses, their 
risk management systems indicated that they should reduce 
their positions and their lending, which raised margins. 
My conclusion is that there was no flight to quality into 
Treasuries in the fall of 1998: instead, there was a liquidation of 
short Treasury positions by massively leveraged hedge funds. 
These actions drove spreads up to such an extent that other 
market participants, many of whom had entirely different 
trading strategies, were forced to sell or close positions when 
their value-at-risk models indicated that their hedges had 
deteriorated. The irony is that the existence of a Treasury 
benchmark worsened the situation. As Treasury yields were 
pushed lower, all spreads widened, making even more 
positions unprofitable and causing dealers to raise margins on 
repos, which in turn caused even more liquidation of short 
Treasury positions, pushing Treasury yields even lower, and so on.
As a result of these events, it is important to think about 
hedging within a more generic framework. The basic risk borne 
by the financial marketplace—that is, the dealer community—
is not “level” risk, but correlation risk. For example, how does 
the yield spread of one country move against that of another 
country? What happens to the shape of the entire yield curve 
under different scenarios? How does one price a Bermuda 
swaption in the United States? For these risks, the key criterion 
is the correlation between asset-price movements and spreads. 
Therefore, Treasuries often end up being the worst hedges for 
such complicated risks, in part because large shocks can 
significantly change their correlations with other asset prices.
I believe that the usefulness of employing Treasuries for 
hedging purposes has already passed. I have to agree with those 
who argue that swaps, as the market is now structured, are 
almost risk free and in some ways probably less risky than 
Treasuries. Certainly, the credit risk in the underlying LIBOR is 
very small, because poorly performing banks are dropped out 
of that index by the British Bankers Association. In addition, 
nearly all swap transactions are now (or soon will be) marked 
to market daily. Thus, no matter what the underlying credit 
problem is, a trader will have at most one day’s price movement 
risk on a swap, which is essentially the same risk that traders 
have on Treasury and repo transactions. That is to say, when 
you buy a Treasury issue or you do a repo, your credit risk is the 
risk that the dealer might not be around the next day to deliver 
the security. Furthermore, in good times at least, the Treasury 
repo market—like the swaps market—is almost 100percent 
leveraged.
It seems clear to me that a benchmark futures contract based 
on LIBOR swaps will be able to replace Treasuries. In this sense, 
the United States will be following Europe. When the European 
swaps market first began to develop, I recall visiting European 
institutions and explaining how we priced instruments from 
government benchmarks. People there found this practice 
surprising—nobody knew what a government benchmark was. 
The institutions traded their securities from swaps and futures 
benchmarks rather than from governments. Today, the 
European marketplace has the largest futures trading in the 
Eurex, far surpassing U.S. futures contracts and fixed-income 
securities. Furthermore, because the swaps market in the euro 
is the universal market, swaps spreads usually trade below 
government spreads. This is completely rational for the euro 
because swaps are far more liquid than instruments such as 
European government bonds.
Interestingly enough, the benchmark shift has already 
started in the United States. The thirty-year Treasury bond is 
no longer the lead contract for the U.S. futures markets. About 
four weeks ago, the ten-year note futures became the dominant 
futures contract in the United States, trading more open 
interest and volume than the thirty-year bond futures did. In 
addition, corporate bond debt and mortgage-backed debt 
traders are now hedging their collateral with interest-rate 
swaps. This is certainly not a risk-free game and, looking 
forward, we are likely to see the swaps market change its 
characteristics. For example, swap rates may be influenced 
by mortgage prepayment risk, if mortgage-backed securities 
are hedged in swaps first and then filtered through to the 
Treasury market.
In point of fact, the benchmark status of the Treasury 
market has been changing over the past ten to twelve years. 
Within five to ten years, it seems almost certain that we will 
have a swaps-based financial marketplace, where only the cash 
flows will matter, and where market participants will not be 
concerned with how the flows are bundled. This scenario will 
be an improvement over the uncertain supply conditions that 
often drive Treasuries and, more importantly, the Treasury 
repo market.
In fact, the Treasury repo market is unique: no other 
country has or is developing the kind of liquid repo markets 
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do not serve as benchmarks. Elsewhere, when a government 
security position is financed, it is done at about the swaps or the 
LIBOR rate. Yet it is precisely this phenomenal institutional 
repo system in the United States that drives the market for 
Treasuries and, as such, sometimes makes Treasuries appear to 
be so strange and distorted in their relationships with other 
instruments. If the Treasury market’s benchmark status is 
changed, and there is much less need to borrow and lend 
Treasuries directly, I believe we will see a much more stable 
environment for trading and hedging. In addition, the 
combination of Treasuries being “risk-free” and being a 
benchmark is detrimental to hedging, because only the 
government can actually borrow risk-free. By changing 
benchmarks, we will alleviate some of that hedging problem.
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